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ized economies that have been overlooked by the literature. In our theory, increasing variety of
consumer goods and increasing 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1 Introduction
In clarifying the process by which economies transition from Malthusian stagnation to modern
economic growth, unied growth theory provides an ideal theoretical framework for studying the
causes of the Industrial Revolution.1 However, although this literature elucidates one of historys
great mysteries, it has not accounted for a number of salient features of countriestransitions from
stagnant, predominantly rural economies to vibrant, industrial economies. The objective of this
paper is to enhance our understanding of the causes of the Industrial Revolution by putting forth
a unied growth theory consistent with a number of relevant features previously overlooked.
The main features captured in our theory are the large increase in the variety of consumer
goods that preceded the Industrial Revolution, the so-called Consumer Revolution documented
by Styles (2000) and Berg (2002), and the organizational shift in the workplace from the cottage
industry and putting-out system to the centralized factory, as documented by Szostak (1989) and
Berg (1994). In our theory, increasing variety of consumer goods and increasing rm size, which are
the consequence of a gradual expansion in the market, sow the seeds for process innovation and the
economys take-o¤. We demonstrate this mechanism in a dynamic general equilibrium model and
show that our theory is empirically plausible by deriving its quantitative implications in a model
calibrated to the historical experience of England.
The mechanism linking market size to innovation works by changing the price elasticity of
demand of non-agricultural consumer products. A larger market allows an economy to sustain a
greater variety of consumer goods, making them more substitutable and raising their price elasticity
of demand. As a result, mark-ups drop and competition toughens so that rms must become larger
to break even. This facilitates process innovation, as larger rms can spread the xed costs of R&D
over a greater quantity of output. Therefore, innovation endogenously takes o¤and living standards
start to rise only after the market reaches a critical size and competition becomes su¢ ciently intense.
The evolution of markets is thus a precondition for the revolution of industry.
We generate this elasticity e¤ect by embedding Lancaster (1979) preferences into a model of
product and process innovation. The Lancaster construct, based on Hotellings (1929) spatial model
of horizontal di¤erentiation, assumes that each household has an ideal variety of an industrial good,
identied by its location on a circle.2 As goods ll up this circle, neighboring varieties become
1See the Lawrence R. Klein lecture by Galor (2009) for an excellent overview of the achievements of unied growth
theory.
2Salop (1979) is a similar construct based on Hotellings (1929) spatial model of horizontal di¤erentiation.
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closer substitutes, implying a higher price elasticity of demand and a lower mark-up (Helpman and
Krugman, 1985, Hummels and Lugovskyy, 2005). As shown by Desmet and Parente (2010) in a
static one-sector model, these preferences imply a positive e¤ect of market size on technological
innovation.
Apart from the preference structure, the model is fairly standard and in some aspects
simpler than alternative unied growth models. In the spirit of Galor and Weil (2000), it includes
a farm sector that produces a subsistence agricultural good, and it assumes parents derive utility
from having children. However, in contrast to models that emphasize the role of human capital
in economic development, parents do not face a tradeo¤ between the quantity and the quality of
children.3 Instead, there is a time-rearing cost to having children that is lower on the farm than
in the city. With these features, the model not only generates a rapid transition from Malthusian
stagnation to modern growth, but also a structural transformation with a declining agricultural
share, and a demographic transition with population growth initially rising with the advent of
industrialization and subsequently falling.
The model works as follows. On account of low initial agricultural productivity, the subsis-
tence constraint binds and the economy starts o¤ with most of its population employed in agricul-
ture. Given that so few people live and work in the city and given the xed operating cost, only a
small number of industrial varieties are produced, implying that goods are not particularly substi-
tutable. Mark-ups are high, competition is weak, and hence, rms are small. As a result, rms do
not nd it protable to incur the xed costs of innovation. However, during this Malthusian phase
with stagnant living standards, exogenous increases in agricultural TFP allow for increases in the
population and a larger urban base, which result in more consumer varieties, tougher competition,
and larger rms. Eventually, the industrial market reaches a critical size so that rms become
su¢ ciently large to nd process innovation protable. At this point, rms endogenously lower their
marginal costs, and an industrial revolution ensues.
Process innovation in the industrial sector then sets o¤ a demographic transition and a
structural transformation. The nonhomotheticity of preferences that follows from the subsistence
constraint implies that both rural and urban households have more children as incomes rise. This
leads to accelerating population growth: the rst phase of the demographic transition. But at the
same time, the nonhomotheticity also implies that rising incomes lead to a structural transforma-
tion, with a decreasing agricultural employment share. This puts a brake on aggregate fertility
3See, e.g., Becker et al. (1990), Galor, and Weil (2000), and Lucas (2002).
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as urban households have lower fertility than their rural counterparts on account of higher time-
rearing costs. Eventually, this compositional e¤ect dominates this income e¤ect, and the population
growth rate declines: the second phase of the demographic transition.
In the limit, as living standards continue to rise, the subsistence constraint disappears, and
the economy converges to constant agricultural and industrial shares of economic activity. Under
certain parametric conditions, the population growth rate converges to zero, and the price elasticity
of demand approaches a constant. Firms stop increasing in size and the rate of innovation becomes
constant. Thus, the economy converges to a modern growth era with a constant positive growth
rate of per capita GDP.
To assess the plausibility of our theory, we calibrate the model to the historical experience
of England from 1300 to 2000. More specically, we restrict the model parameters to match pre-
1700 and post-1950 English observations, and then test the model by examining its predictions
corresponding to the 1700-1950 period. We nd that the model accounts remarkably well for the
main features of Englands experience during this transition period. In particular, it closely matches
Englands growth path, its structural transformation, and its demographic transition. The model
also does well in matching the evolution of rm size, a feature specic to the theoretical mechanism
we emphasize. The quantitative success of the model, together with independent empirical evidence
on the elasticity mechanism provided in Section 2, constitute strong support for our theory.
Our work clearly belongs to the unied growth theory literature. Some of the important
papers in this literature are Kremer (1993), Goodfriend and McDermott (1995), Galor and Weil
(2000), Hansen and Prescott (2002), Lucas (2002), and Galor and Moav (2002). Although these
papers also analyze the transition from Malthusian stagnation to modern growth within a common
framework that includes population dynamics, they emphasize very di¤erent mechanisms from ours.
Moreover, none of these papers models process innovation in the sense of individual rms spending
resources to lower their marginal costs, or models product innovation as an increase in the variety
of consumer goods.4
Our paper also relates to the literature that uses model calibration to gain intuition for
the causes of the Industrial Revolution. Important papers in this literature are Harley and Crafts
4Although some models, such as Goodfriend and McDermott (1995) and Voigtländer and Voth (2006), allow for
increasing variety of intermediate goods to capture Smiths (1776) hypothesis that the Industrial Revolution was the
consequence of greater specialization, nal goods producers continue to be perfectly competitive. As a result, these
models not only fail to generate an increasing number of consumer commodities, they are also unable to account for
the growing size of rms before and during the Industrial Revolution.
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(2000), Stokey (2001), Lagerlöf (2003, 2006), and Voigtländer and Voth (2006). As these alternative
models are di¤erent from ours, they study the e¤ect of alternative factors on the timing of Englands
takeo¤. In our experiments, we consider three factors, each of which has been emphasized by
other researchers as being important for Englands Industrial Revolution: agriculture productivity
(Schultz, 1968, Diamond, 1997), institutions (North and Thomas, 1973, North and Weingast, 1989),
and trade (Findlay and ORourke, 2007). Our counterfactuals support the view that each of
these factors was important for Englands development. In particular, our experiments suggest
that the Industrial Revolution might have been delayed by several centuries had England had
fewer agricultural innovations, slightly inferior institutional arrangements, and more national and
international trade barriers.
With respect to the older literature on the Industrial Revolution, our theory echoes back to
three branches. The rst is the Industrial Organization school, which views the emergence of large
rms with supervised production as the key to the Industrial Revolution. Important contributions
to this literature are Mantoux (1928), Pollard (1965) and Berg (1994). The second is the Social
Change School, which equates the Industrial Revolution to the development of competitive markets.
This view is present in the work of Toynbee (1884), Polanyi (1944) and Thompson (1963). The
nal branch of this older literature emphasizes demand side factors, in particular, the growth of
the home market and the development of consumer demand. Here some of the important papers
are Gilboy (1932) and McKendrick (1982).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides empirical support for
the mechanism put forth in this paper, and hence serves as motivation. Section 3 describes the
model and characterizes the optimal decisions of agents. Section 4 denes the equilibrium and
shows algebraically that under certain conditions the economy converges to a balanced growth
path. Section 5 calibrates the model to the historical experience of England, and considers how
agricultural productivity, institutions, and trade a¤ected the date of the economys take-o¤. Section
6 concludes the paper.
2 Empirical Motivation
To motivate our theory, we start by presenting empirical evidence for the underlying mechanism by
which greater market size facilitates process innovation. According to this mechanism, increasing
variety of consumer goods raises the price elasticity of demand, leading to falling mark-ups and
larger rms. The increase in rm size, then, strengthens the incentives of rms to lower their
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marginal costs. Thus, in what follows, we document secular trends in product variety, price elasticity
of demand, mark-ups, rm size, and process innovation.
Product innovation Consistent with the historical record, our model leads to both product and
process innovation. A growing body of literature argues that product innovation was every bit
as important to the Industrial Revolution as process innovation. The creation of new consumer
goods, and the increase in varieties, was an essential feature of the Industrial Revolution and the
period leading up to it. Berg (2002), for example, in analyzing the nature of British patents for
the period 1627-1825 in a subset of industries that includes metal wares, glass, ceramics, furniture
and watches, found that over one-quarter of the 1,610 patents specied new products or variations
of existing ones. In a narrower study, Gri¢ ths et al. (1992) document that roughly half of the 166
patented and non-patented improvements in the textile industry between 1715 and 1800 concerned
product innovation. Similarly, De Vries (1993), using records from probate inventories, documents
increasing variety in household durables through the 18th century, despite relatively stagnant wages.
The increase in new consumer goods and varieties is not a post-17th century phenomenon.
This is consistent with our theory, in which the expansion in varieties starts before the Industrial
Revolution. Weatherwill (1988) argues that the Consumer Revolution peaked between 1680 and
1720. Referring to the 1500-1700 period, Styles (2000) lists a number of products that were either
entirely English inventions or drastically remodeled goods from other societies. For example, from
continental Europe, Delftware plates, Venetian glass, and upholstered chairs and from Asia and
the New World, porcelain, tea, tobacco, sugar, lacquered cabinets, and painted calicos all became
available to English consumers in this period.
Price elasticity of demand. Given our mechanism works by changing the price elasticity of
demand, the strongest support for our theory would be evidence of a secular rise in the price elas-
ticity of demand. Unfortunately, time series estimates for the price elasticity of individual products
do not exist. While uncommon, cross-section studies do support our mechanism. For example,
Barron et al. (2008) nd that larger markets for gasoline in the United States are associated with
more elastic demand, and Hummels and Lugovskyy (2005) document that import demand in larger
markets is more responsive to changes in trade costs.
Mark-ups. Our mechanism implies a secular decline in mark-ups associated with the increase in
the price elasticity of demand as markets expand. Estimates of mark-ups are more readily available,
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although most studies are contemporary. Short-run studies in the context of business cycles and
trade liberalizations strongly suggest that the mark-up is inversely related to market size. Within
the trade literature, Tybout (2003) documents that mark-ups generally fall following liberalization,
and within the business cycle literature, Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) and Chevalier et al.
(2003) nd that mark-ups are countercyclical both at the aggregate and the industry level. To our
knowledge, there is only one long-run study on mark-ups. Ellis (2006) estimates mark-ups in the
United Kingdom for the period 1870-2003 and nds a 67 percent decline in this 134 year period.
Taken together, these studies support the negative relationship between market size and mark-ups
implied by our theory.
Firm size. Another implication of our mechanism is that rm size increases with market size.
Here, studies are much more abundant, and supportive. A large, extensive literature documents
increases in establishment size since industrialization for both England and the United States. For
example, Lloyd-Jones and Le Roux (1980) document that the median number of workers in cotton
rms in Manchester more than tripled between 1815 and 1841, and Feinstein and Pollard (1988)
report that in England production of pig iron per furnace increased from 400 tons in 1750 to 550 in
1790. Using data from the U.S. Census of Manufacturing, Sokolo¤ (1984) nds more of the same in
manufacturing industries over the 19th century, while Granovetter (1984) documents this pattern
continued into the 20th century.
Sokolo¤s (1984) study is particularly relevant for our theory because it shows that rm
size was increasing prior to 1860 in the United States, the starting year of its Industrial Revolution.
In a number of industries such as tanning, hats, boots and shoes, the increases in rm size were
not associated with mechanization of the production processes. This is consistent with our theory,
which predicts that the increase in rm size predates process innovation and the economys take-o¤.
The Sokolo¤ study further supports our mechanism by uncovering a positive correlation
between market size, rm size, and the level of industrialization. In particular, the study nds that
more densely populated areas had larger rms within a given industry. For example, in the woollen
textiles in 1850 average rm size was 38.7 in New England, compared to 14.5 in the Mid Atlantic,
and 6.5 in the rest of the country. Additionally, the study nds that more densely populated areas
industrialized rst. Finally, in those instances where artisan shops where found to coexist with
factories during the rst half of the 19th century, the study nds that artisan shops were located
in rural areas with low population density and high transportation costs.
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There do not seem to be hard numbers of rm size in England predating the Industrial
Revolution. Nevertheless, a burgeoning literature on proto-industrialization suggests that rm size
increased substantially before the onset of Englands takeo¤. Proto-industrialization refers to the
period between 1500 and 1700, when non-agricultural goods were produced in the countryside for
large regional, and even international, markets. It is associated with the rise of the putting-out
system, consisting of merchant capitalists who sold inputs to rural households and bought nished
goods in return. Under this system merchants controlled and centralized a number of activities,
such as marketing and nance, but left production decentralized and in control of rural households.
If one interprets the putting-out network as an organization, then the size of organizations was
clearly increasing before the Industrial Revolution. The only di¤erence, compared to the factory
system, is that not all tasks were performed under the same roof.
Some centralization of production did occur in this period, often employing large workforces.
For example, workshops employing over forty parish apprentices existed in Nottingham as early
as the 1720s. Indeed, by the time that Hargreaves and Arkwright went to Nottingham with their
inventions, the concentration of labor in factories was a fairly familiar idea (Berg, 1994). These
proto-factories di¤ered from their followers in that they tended to be limited to specic parts of
the production process. For example, in the cotton industry, spinning became centralized, whereas
weaving was still left to the cottage industries. Similarly, in the woollen industry, although the
artisan system was retained, clothiers used cooperative mills that centralized part of the production
process.
Many researchers, particularly Mendels (1972), argue that the rise of the cottage industry
was a critical step in the eventual industrialization of the British economy. Indeed, Mendels claims
that the proto-industrialization period was a critical transition phase from the feudal world of the
Middle Ages to the capitalist world of the modern era. Our work complements this area of research.
In our theory increases in rm size not only predate the start of the Industrial Revolution, they are
necessary for it to occur.
Firm size and process innovation. The nal link in our mechanism is the one from rm size
to process innovation. The idea that rm size facilitates process innovation has a long history in
economics, going back as far as Schumpeter (1942). There is much empirical evidence supporting
this idea. For example, Atack et al. (2008) nd that larger rms were more likely to use steam power
in the 19th century. Hannan and McDowell (1984) reach a similar conclusion when analyzing the
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relationship between the size of banks and the adoption of ATMs in the 1970s. In examining R&D
expenditures, Cohen and Klepper (1996) nd they rise with rm size, with an increasing share of
this rise being allocated to process innovation. In the case of the U.S. Industrial Revolution Sokolo¤
(1988) nds that patenting activity was greater in larger markets, which tended to have larger rms
(Sokolo¤, 1984).
3 The Model
In this section we describe the structure of the model economy. The economy consists of one
country, with a rural and an urban area, and zero transportation costs.5 Time is discrete and
innite. There are three sectors: a farm sector, an industrial sector, and a household sector. The
farm sector is perfectly competitive and produces a single non-storable consumption good. The farm
technology uses labor and land and is subject to exogenous technological change. The industrial
sector is monopolistically competitive and produces a nite set of di¤erentiated goods, each of which
has a unique address on a circle. There is both product and process innovation in the industrial
sector. The household sector consists of one-period lived agents, each of whom derives utility
from consumption of the agricultural good, consumption of the di¤erentiated industrial goods, and
children. For each household, there is a variety of the di¤erentiated good that it prefers above all
others. Households earn income by either working in the farm sector or the industrial sector. In
addition to working, households use their time to rear children, who constitute the household sector
in the next period. In what follows we describe the model structure and the relevant optimization
problems encountered by agents in each sector.
3.1 Household Sector
Endowments. At the beginning of period t there is a measure Nt of households. Each household
is endowed with one unit of time, which it uses to rear children and to work in either the farm
or the industrial sector. There are no barriers to migration, so that a household is free to work
in either sector. Denote by Nft and N
x
t the measure of households employed in agriculture and
industry. Thus,
Nt = N
f
t +N
x
t : (1)
5A richer version would allow for multiple countries and transportation (or trade) costs. Although this would
allow us to analyze the e¤ect of a reduction in transportation (or trade) costs, it would come at the cost of increased
analytical complexity.
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Each type of household is uniformly distributed on a circle with circumference .
Preferences. A household derives utility from the number of children it raises, nt, consumption
of the agricultural good, cat, and consumption of the di¤erentiated industrial goods, fcvtgv2Vt ,
where Vt denotes the set of di¤erentiated goods produced at time t. Following the literature on
the structural transformation and the demographic transition, each household has an agricultural
subsistence constraint, represented by ca in the utility function. Departing from the literature on
the demographic transition, we assume that household utility does not depend on the quality of
children.
A household located at point ~v on the -circumference circle has the following Cobb-Douglas
preferences:
U~v(cat; nt; fcvtgv2Vt) = [(cat   ca)1 [g(cvtjv 2 Vt)]](nt)1 ; (2)
where
g(cvtjv 2 Vt) = max
v2Vt
[
cvt
1 + dv~v
]: (3)
The subutility g(cvtjv 2 Vt) follows Lancaster (1979) by assuming that each household has a variety
of the di¤erentiated good that it prefers above all others. This ideal variety corresponds to the
households location on the circle, ~v. The further away an industrial variety v lies from a households
ideal variety, the lower the utility it derives from consuming a unit of variety v. In particular, the
quantity of variety v that gives the household the same utility as one unit of its ideal variety ~v is
1 + dv~v, where dv~v denotes the shortest arc distance between v and ~v, and  > 0 is a parameter
that determines how fast a households utility diminishes with the distance from its ideal variety.6
The Lancaster construct is the essential element of our model, as it generates a positive
link between e¤ective market size and process innovation through the elasticity of demand. It is
not the only construct that generates an elasticity e¤ect, however. For example, Ottaviano et al.
(2002) use a quasilinear utility function with quadratic subutility to generate this e¤ect, and Yang
and Heijdra (1993) accomplish this with Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz preferences assuming that individual
rms internalize the e¤ect of their pricing decision on the aggregate price level. The reasons we
adopted Lancaster preferences is that its e¤ect does not depend on whether rms take into account
how their price choice a¤ects the aggregate price level, and it implies that demand increases with
income. Moreover, the elasticity e¤ect arises in a very intuitive way in the Lancaster setting; the
6The expression 1 + dv~v is known as Lancasters compensation function.
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bounded product space implies that as varieties ll up the circle, neighboring varieties become
closer substitutes, implying a higher price elasticity of demand.7
Demographics. Households live for one period. Let nit denote the number of children of a
household that is employed in sector i 2 ff; xg.8 The law of motion for the population is then
Nt+1 = n
f
tN
f
t + n
x
tN
x
t : (4)
There is a time cost of rearing children, denoted by  i, that depends on the sector i 2 ff; xg in which
the household works. By assumption, this time cost is higher in the city than in the countryside,
i.e., x   f . This assumption is consistent with the historical record. Jones and Tertilt (2006),
for example, report that the number of children per woman was higher in non-urban areas than on
farms throughout the 19th century, and Williamson (1985) reports that the natural rate of increase
for the urban population in 19th century England was lower than in the countryside. The reasons
for these regional fertility and population di¤erences are multiple. For one, infant mortality was
higher in the city on account of unhealthy living conditions, a problem that persisted in the United
States until the advent of urban sanitation systems in the 1920s. For another, laws restricting child
labor in 19th century England applied only to factory work (Doepke and Zilibotti, 2005).9
The assumption of di¤erent time rearing costs is important for generating the second phase
of the demographic transition, namely the decline in the population growth rate as the economy
approaches the modern growth stage. However, the same pattern could easily be achieved by
assuming a secular increase in the time cost of rearing children, which could reect the increasing
role of human capital in the production process. This would be a straightforward way of introducing
the quantity-quality tradeo¤ in parentsfertility decisions. We do not make this assumption because
it would require historical data that is not readily available for the purpose of calibrating the model.
7To our knowledge, Peretto (1998) is the rst to establish the link between market size and take-o¤, adopting the
Yang and Heijdra (1993) construct. However, his paper does not belong to the unied growth theory literature since
there are no population dynamics. Instead, the increase in the market size is a consequence of an increase in the
stock of knowledge.
8We need not index the number of children by a households location on the circle because the fertility choice is
independent of location. This is also the case for the agricultural good.
9Another reason is that it was possible to simultaneously watch children and tend vegetables in the countryside,
but not in the city, where factory work dominated. Of course, the higher number of children in rural areas may also
have been due to them being able to work more easily on the farm than in the factory (Rosenzweig and Evensen,
1977, Doepke, 2004). In our model, however, children do not participate in the labor force.
10
Utility Maximization. The di¤erential cost of rearing children in the city and on the farm
implies that household income will be di¤erent across sectors in equilibrium, even though households
are free to move at the beginning of the period. We therefore distinguish between an agricultural
households income per unit of time worked, yft , and an industrial households income per unit of
time worked, yxt . The budget constraint of a household working in sector i 2 ff; xg is then
yit(1   init)  ciat +
X
v2V
pvtc
i
vt (5)
Maximizing (2) subject to (5) yields the following rst order necessary conditions:
ciat = (1  )(yit   ca) + ca (6)X
v2Vt
pvtc
i
vt = (y
i
t   ca) (7)
 init = (1  )(1 
ca
yit
) (8)
We make assumptions on the technology parameters to ensure that yit(1   init) > ca for all t  0.
To further characterize the optimal consumption of the di¤erentiated goods, we exploit the
linearity property of the subutility function (3) with respect to the set of di¤erentiated goods.
This implies that each agent consumes a single industrial variety. In particular, an agent buys
the variety, v0 2 Vt; that minimizes the cost of an equivalent unit of its ideal variety, pvt(1 + dv~v).
Namely,
v0 = argmin[pvt(1 + d

v;~v)jv 2 Vt]: (9)
Using (7), a household with ideal variety ~v working in sector i therefore buys the following quantity
of variety v0:
civ0t =
(yit   ca)
pv0t
(10)
Its demand for all other varieties v 2 Vt is zero.
3.2 Industrial Sector
The industrial sector is monopolistically competitive, and produces a set of di¤erentiated goods,
each with a unique address on the -circumference circle. As in Lancaster (1979), rms can cost-
lessly relocate on the circle. The technology for producing industrial goods uses labor as its only
input. The existence of a xed cost, which takes the form of labor, gives rise to increasing returns.
Each rm chooses its price and technology, taking aggregate variables and the choices of other rms
as given. There is free entry and exit, so that the number of rms, and varieties, will adjust to
ensure all rms make zero prots.
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Production. Let Qvt be the quantity of variety v produced by a rm; Lvt the units of labor it
employs; Avt its technology level, or production process; and vt its xed cost in terms of labor.
Then the output in period t of the rm producing variety v is
Qvt = Avt[Lvt   vt] (11)
Both the xed labor cost, vt, and the technology level, Avt, depend on the rms rate of process
innovation, gvt. In particular, similar to Young (1998), the xed labor cost is given by
vt = e
gvt : (12)
Thus, there are two components to the xed cost: an innovation cost, represented by egvt , that is
increasing in the size of process innovation, gvt, on account that  > 0, and an operating cost, ,
that is incurred even if there is no process innovation. The rms technology level, Avt, is given by
Avt = (1 + gvt)Axt; (13)
where Axt is the benchmark technology in period t, taken to be the average technology used by
industrial rms in period t  1:
Axt =
X
v2Vt 1
1
mt 1
Av;t 1; (14)
where mt 1 is the number of varieties produced in period t  1, i.e., mt 1 = card(Vt 1). Therefore,
if gvt = 0, so there is no process innovation, a rm uses the industrial benchmark technology, Axt,
whereas if gvt > 0, the rm uses a technology that is (1 + gvt) times greater than the benchmark
technology.10
Prot Maximization. The xed operating cost implies that each variety, regardless of the
technology used, will be produced by a single rm. In maximizing its prots, each rm behaves non-
cooperatively, taking the choices of other rms as given. Prot maximization determines the price
and quantity to be sold, the number of workers to be hired, and the technology to be operated. As
is standard in models of monopolistic competition, rms take all aggregate variables in the economy
as given.11
10Thus, we assume complete intertemporal knowledge spillovers. While the existence of this spillover implies a
dynamic ine¢ ciency, it is not important to the points we wish to establish. We make the assumption because it is
not possible to solve for an equilibrium with asymmetric rms using Lancasters construct. Without the assumption
of complete intertemporal knowledge spillovers, new varieties would start out at a lower technology, and hence there
would not be a symmetric equilibrium.
11 In principle this requires rms to be of measure zero, a condition that is not satised. See Desmet and Parente
(2010) for a discussion of how rms could be made of measure zero, without changing any of the results.
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Using (11), the prots of the rm producing variety v, vt, can be written as
vt = pvtCvt   wxt[egvt + Cvt
Axt(1 + gvt)
]; (15)
where wxt is the wage in the industrial sector, and pvt is the price of variety v.
The problem of the rm producing variety v is to choose (pvt; gvt) to maximize (15), subject
to the aggregate demand for its product, Cvt. As usual, the prot maximizing price is a mark-up
over the marginal unit cost wxt=[Axt(1 + gvt)], so that
pvt =
wxt
Axt(1 + gvt)
"vt
"vt   1 ; (16)
where "vt is the price elasticity of demand for variety v:
"vt =  @Cvt
@pvt
pvt
Cvt
:
The rst order necessary condition associated with the choice of technology, gvt, is
 egvt + Cvt
Axt(1 + gvt)2
 0; (17)
where the strict inequality case in the above expression corresponds to a corner solution, i.e.,
gvt = 0.
3.3 Farm Sector
The farm sector is perfectly competitive. Farms produce a single, non-storable consumption good,
that serves as the economys numéraire. The farm technology is constant returns to scale, and uses
labor and land. There is a measure one of farms.
Production. Let Qat denote the quantity of agricultural output of the stand-in farm, and Lat the
corresponding agricultural labor input. Without loss of generality, we normalize the land owned by
the stand-in farm to 1. The production function is Cobb-Douglas in land and labor with a labor
share of 1   > 0, namely,
Qat = AatL

at (18)
Agricultural TFP, Aat, grows at a rate gat > 0 during period t, so that
Aat+1 = Aat(1 + gat): (19)
13
During the Malthusian phase agricultural TFP grows at a constant exogenous rate, a > 0.
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However, once the industrial sector starts innovating, we allow for agricultural TFP growth to
accelerate. In particular, we assume that
gat = maxfa;
Axt  Axt 1
Axt 1
g (20)
This assumption is meant to capture the large secular rise in the growth rate of agricultural TFP
since the Industrial Revolution, as documented by Federico (2006). Implicitly, it reects the im-
portance of innovations in the form of farm equipment and synthetic fertilizers originating in the
industrial sector.13
Prot Maximization. The prot maximization problem of farms is straightforward, as they are
price takers. The prot of the stand-in farm is
at = AatLat
   watLat (21)
where wat is the agricultural wage rate. Farms choose Lat to maximize equation (21). This yields
the standard rst order condition
wat = Aat(Lat)
 1: (22)
Total prots (or land rents) are thus,
at = (1  )Aat(Lat) (23)
and prots per unit of time worked, at, are
at = (1  )Aat(Lat) 1: (24)
Prots (or land rents) are rebated to the farm households in proportion to their time worked.
Hence, total income of a farm household per unit of time worked is the sum of wages per unit of
time worked and prots per unit of time worked:
yft = Aat(Lat)
 1 (25)
12To be consistent with the historical record of a slowly increasing population during the pre-industrial era, agri-
cultural TFP growth must be positive if there are decreasing returns to land.
13Alternatively, though at the cost of substantial complexity, the same qualitative results could be obtained by
having farms use industrial goods as intermediate inputs, rather than assuming that agricultural TFP growth depends
on technological progress in the industrial sector. As technological improvement in industry lowers the relative price
of industrial goods, farms would use more industrial intermediate inputs, thereby increasing farm labor productivity.
Results for this setup are available from the authors upon request.
14
Urban households, therefore, do not receive any farm prots. Their income per unit of time worked
is
yxt = wxt (26)
4 Equilibrium
As is standard in this literature, we focus exclusively on symmetric Nash equilibria. In such an
equilibrium, all rms use the same technology, charge the same price, and are equally spaced around
the circle. This section denes a symmetric Nash equilibrium for our economy, and explores the
limiting properties of the equilibrium. It consists of three parts. In the rst part, we derive the
aggregate demand for each good in the symmetric case, and use this to simplify the rst order prot
maximization conditions. In the second part, we dene a symmetric equilibrium. In the last part,
we establish a set of parametric restrictions that ensure that the economy converges to a balanced
growth path.
4.1 Aggregate Demand
We rst determine the aggregate demand for each industrial good. Demand comes from both
types of households. Since in a symmetric Nash equilibrium all varieties produced are equally
spaced around the circle, aggregate demand for a given variety depends only on the locations and
the prices of its closest neighbors to its right and its left on the circle. Let dt denote the distance
between two neighboring varieties in period t. This distance is inversely proportional to the number
of varieties, mt, namely,
dt =

mt
: (27)
Since the nearest competitors to the right and to the left of the rm producing variety v are each
located at the same distance dt from it, we do not need to di¤erentiate between them, and thus
denote each competitor by vc and their prices by pct.
To begin, we derive the aggregate demand of agricultural households for variety v. The
rst step is to identify the location of the household on the circle that is indi¤erent between buying
variety v and variety vc. Recall that each household will buy that variety for which the unit cost of
an equivalent unit of its ideal variety is lowest. Thus, the agricultural household that is indi¤erent
between buying varieties v and vc is the one whose cost of a quantity equivalent to one unit of its
ideal variety in terms of v equals the cost of a quantity equivalent to one unit of its ideal variety
in terms of vc. Consequently, the agricultural household that is indi¤erent between v and vc is the
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one located at distance dvt from v, where
pct[1 + (d  dvt) ] = pvt[1 + dvt]: (28)
Given this indi¤erence condition applies to agricultural households both to the right and to the left
of v, the uniform distribution of agricultural households around the -circumference circle implies
that a share 2dvt= of them consumes variety v. Since each household spends (y
f
t   ca) on the
industrial good, the total demand for v by agricultural households is
Cfvt =
2dvtN
f
t c
f
vt

=
2dvtN
f
t

(yft   ca)
pvt
: (29)
By analogy, total demand by industrial households is
Cxvt =
2dvtN
x
t c
x
vt

=
2dvtN
x
t c
x
vt

(yxt   ca)
pvt
: (30)
Given that all rms are spaced evenly in the symmetric equilibrium, it follows that
2dvt = dt: (31)
Aggregate demand for variety v, Cvt, is the sum of (29) and (30). Hence,
Cvt = dt(N
f
t c
f
vt +N
x
t c
x
t )= =
dt

(yft N
f
t + y
x
tN
x
t  Ntca)
pvt
(32)
With this demand in hand, we can solve for the price elasticity in a symmetric Nash equi-
librium. This involves three steps. First, from (32) it is easy to show that
 @Cv
@pv
p v
Cv
= 1  @dv
@pv
pv
dv
(33)
Next, by taking the total derivative of the indi¤erence equation (28) with respect to pvt, we solve
for @dvt=@pvt, and substituting this partial derivative in (33) yields
"vt = 1 +
[1 + dv ]pv
[pvd
 1
v + pc(d  dv) 1]d v
(34)
Finally, we invoke symmetry, i.e., pvt = pct and 2dvt = dt, so that (34) reduces to
"vt = 1 +
1
2
(
2
dt
) +
1
2
(35)
Thus, as the number of varieties increases, the price elasticity of demand increases.
Aggregate demand for the agricultural good is easy to determine. Individual households
demand, (6), implies that aggregate demand is
Cat = (1  )(yft Nft + yxtNxt  Ntca) +Ntca (36)
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4.2 Symmetric Equilibrium
We next dene a symmetric Nash equilibrium for our economy. Because the decisions of households,
industrial rms and farms are all static, the dynamic equilibrium for the model economy is essen-
tially a sequence of static equilibria that are linked through the laws of motion for the population,
the benchmark technology in the industrial sector, and TFP in the farm sector.
As is standard, the equilibrium must satisfy prot maximization, utility maximization, and
market clearing conditions. It must also be the case that each household is indi¤erent between
working in the farm sector and working in the industrial sector. More specically, for a household
with ideal variety v the utility associated with consumption and children should be the same across
sectors:
U(cfvt; c
f
at; n
f
t ) = U(c
x
vt; c
x
at; n
x
t ): (37)
Another equilibrium condition requires that rms in the industrial sector earn zero prots. This is
a consequence of there being free entry. Thus,
pvtQvt   wxt[egvt + Qvt
Axt(1 + gvt)
] = 0 (38)
This condition e¤ectively determines the number of varieties and the distance between varieties.
The zero prot condition (38), together with mark-up equation (16) and the elasticity
equation in the symmetric equilibrium (35), provide the key to understanding the positive relation
between market size and rm size. From the elasticity expression (35) it is apparent that as the
number of varieties increases, and the distance between rms decreases, the price elasticity of
demand increases. This result is easy to understand: by increasing the number of varieties, the
circle becomes more crowded, making neighboring varieties more substitutable. From the price
expression (16), it follows that the greater elasticity leads to tougher competition, reducing the
mark-up. The zero prot condition (38) then implies that the size of rms, in terms of production,
must increase: given the same xed cost, a rm must sell a greater quantity of units in order to
break even. As we will see later, larger rms nd it easier to bear the xed cost of innovation,
leading to a positive relation between market size and technological progress.
We now dene the dynamic Symmetric Equilibrium.
Denition of Symmetric Equilibrium. A Symmetric Equilibrium is a sequence of household
variables fcfvt; cfat; nft ; yft ; Nft ; cxvt; cxat; nxt ; yxt ; Nxt g, a sequence of farm variables fQat; Lat; atg, a se-
quence of industrial rm variables fQvt; Lvt; pvt; gvt; "vt; Avtg, and a sequence of aggregate variables
fVt; wxt;mt; wat; dt; Nt; Axt; Aatg that satisfy
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(i) utility maximization conditions given by (6), (7) and (8).
(ii) farm prot maximization conditions given by equations (18), (22), (24) and (25).
(iii) industrial prot maximization conditions given by (11), (13), (12), (26), (16), (17), and (35)
(iv) market clearing conditions
(a) industrial goods market: equation (11) = equation (32)
(b) industrial labor market:
mtLvt = N
x
t (1  xnxt ) (39)
(c) farm goods market: equation (18) = equation (36)
(d) farm labor market:
Lat = N
f
t (1   fnft ) (40)
(v) aggregate laws of motion for Axt given by (14); for Nt given by (4); and for Aat given by (19)
and (20)
(vi) zero prot condition of industrial rms given by (38)
(vii) indi¤erence condition of households given by (37)
(viii) population feasibility given by (1)
4.3 Properties
We conclude this section by addressing the limiting properties of the model, namely, whether the
economy converges to a balanced growth path.
Proposition 1. The economy converges to a balanced growth path with constant technological
progress in industry provided that (i) (1 
f
  1)(1  )( 
x
f
)
1 
 + (1 
f
  1) = 0, (ii) gat > 0 for all t,
and (iii)  is su¢ ciently close to 1.
Proof. We start by recalling three equilibrium conditions: at all times utility should be equal across
farming and industrial households,
(yft   ca)(
1  ca=yft
 f
)1  = (yxt   ca)(
1  ca=yxt
x
)1  (41)
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and income should equal expenditure in both sectors,
yft N
f
t (1   fnft ) = (1  )(yft Nft + yxtNxt ) + (1  (1  ))ca(Nft +Nxt ) (42)
yxtN
x
t (1  xnxt ) = (yft Nft + yxtNxt )  ca(Nxt +Nxt ): (43)
We now show that yft in the limit goes to innity. To do so, it su¢ ces to show that the
growth in yft is strictly positive in each period. Since y
f
t = AatL
 1
at , this amounts to showing that
gat   (1  )
_Lat
Lat
> 0: (44)
Expression (8) implies that population growth is nite, and therefore growth in the hours worked
in agriculture is also nite, so that if  is close enough to 1, expression (44) is satised.
Condition (41) implies that if yft goes to innity in the limit, then y
x
t also goes to innity in
the limit. This, in turn, implies that in the limit both types of households have a constant (though
di¤erent) number of children:
ni =
1  
 i
(45)
where i 2 ff; xg. As the number of children is constant in the limit, the utility indi¤erence condition
(41) implies that
yf
yx
= (
 f
x
)
1 
 : (46)
Moreover, if we divide equation (42) by (43), it follows that in the limit
yfNf
yxNx
=
1  

: (47)
Substituting (46) into (47) then gives the following limit expression:
Nf
Nx
=
1  

(
x
 f
)
1 
 : (48)
Thus, the shares of agricultural and industrial households converge to xed numbers. This together
with (45), implies that in the limit population growth is constant. Substituting (48) and (45) into
the expression for population growth, (nf 1)Nf=N+(nx 1)Nx=N gives the following expression:
(
1  
 f
  1)
1 
 (
x
f
)
1 

1 + 1  (
x
f
)
1 

+ (
1  
x
  1) 1
1 + 1  (
x
f
)
1 

(49)
Therefore, if (1 
f
  1)(1  )( 
x
f
)
1 
 +(1 
f
  1) = 0, as stated in condition (ii), population growth
converges to zero. With a constant population, a constant number of children in each sector, and a
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constant share of households employed in the industrial sector in the limit, it follows that the total
number of hours worked in industry also converges to a constant.
It is now easy to show that in the limit gv is a constant. The case where gv = 0 is
trivial. Thus, we focus on the case of an interior solution (gv > 0). The zero prot condition,
Qv = e
gvAx(1 + gv)("   1), together with the rst order condition for technological progress,
(17), implies that gv is a positive function of the price elasticity of demand:
gv =
"v   1

  1: (50)
Since the total production of each rm is egvAx(1 + gv)("   1) and the total number of hours
worked in industry is Nx in the limit, it follows that the number of rms is m = Nx=(egv"),
where m = =d. Substituting into (35) gives
" = 1 +
1
2
(
2Nx
egv"
) +
1
2
: (51)
Now re-write (51) as
2"+1   (2 + 1)"   (2Nx=egv) = 0 (52)
and take the total derivative of this expression with respect to gv. This yields
@"
@gv
=   (2N
x)() e gv
2( + 1)"t   (2 + 1)" 1
: (53)
From (35) we know that " > 1, so that this derivative (53) is strictly negative. Given that (51)
implies that " is decreasing in gv and (50) implies that " is increasing in gv, and given that Nx
is constant in the limit, there is a unique, and constant, gv, and thus a unique, and constant, ".
Therefore, if Nx is constant, gv is also constant. The economy therefore converges to a balanced
growth path with constant growth in the industrial sector.
In Proposition 1 we have shown that if population growth converges to zero, the economy
converges to a balanced growth path with constant technological progress in the industrial sector.
(This constant rate of technological progress may be zero.) Next, we show that the rate of techno-
logical progress in the limit is an increasing function of the balanced growth path population, N ,
and a decreasing function of the cost of innovation, .
Proposition 2. Technological progress in the balanced growth path is an increasing function of
population, N , and a decreasing function of the innovation cost parameter, .
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Proof. As argued in the proof of Proposition 1, on the balanced growth path, expressions (50) and
(51) determine the rate of technological progress and the price elasticity of demand. Expression
(50) does not depend on Nx, whereas expression (51) does. To see this, re-write (51) as (52) and
totally di¤erentiate, keeping gv xed. This gives
@"
@Nx
=
(2=egv)(Nx) 1
2( + 1)"   (2 + 1)" 1 (54)
Since " > 1, the above partial derivative is strictly positive, so that an increase in Nx leads to a
greater elasticity of demand for any given gv. Recall that expression (50) implies that the elasticity
is upward sloping in gv, whereas expression (51) implies that the elasticity is downward sloping in
gv. This, together with the fact that a greater value of Nx causes an upward shift in expression
(51), allows us to conclude that gv is increasing in Nx. Since Nx is a xed share of N , gv is therefore
also increasing in the size of the population.
To show that gv is decreasing in , we use a similar argument. Re-write (51) as (52) and
totally di¤erentiate with respect to , keeping Nx and gv constant. This gives
@"
@
=   (2N
x)() gve gv
2( + 1)"   (2 + 1)" 1 (55)
Since " > 1, the above partial derivative is strictly negative, so that an increase in  leads to a
smaller elasticity of demand for any given gv. By analogy with the above argument, this implies
that gv is decreasing in .
The intuition for the positive relation between the size of the limit population and the
balanced growth path rate of technological progress is straightforward. A greater population leads
to a larger number of households employed in the industrial sector. The greater size of the industrial
sector, and the larger number of varieties produced, imply lower mark-ups and tougher competition.
To break even, industrial rms must become larger. These larger rms then endogenously choose
to innovate more. This is obvious from the rst order condition on technology choice, (17), which
exhibits two e¤ects: an increase in innovation raises a rms xed cost and lowers its marginal
cost. The rst (negative) e¤ect is independent of rm size, whereas the second (positive) e¤ect is
increasing in rm size. As a result, larger rms innovate more.
Propositions 1 and 2 have important implications. Starting o¤ in a situation with no
technological progress in industry, two situations can arise. If population reaches the critical size
for take-o¤ before population growth converges to zero, we will get an industrial revolution, and
the economy will converge to a balanced growth path with strictly positive technological progress
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in industry. However, if population growth converges to zero before that critical size is reached, we
have an industrialization trap, and the industrial sector never innovates. As Proposition 2 suggests,
this industrialization trap becomes increasingly likely, the higher is . This is easy to see when
considering the extreme case of  being innite. Then obviously there will never be any take-o¤.14
The result that population growth must be zero in order for there to be a balanced growth
path reects the presence of a scale e¤ect in the model. Empirically, the question of whether
there are scale e¤ects (in growth rates) in the postwar period is controversial. For example, at the
aggregate level, Jones (2005) nds no evidence of scale e¤ects, whereas Alesina et al. (2000) do, once
they control for trade openness. Likewise, at the micro level, Laincz and Peretto (2006) conclude
there are no scale e¤ects, whereas Backus et al. (1992) report scale e¤ects in the manufacturing
sector.
It is not this papers intent to weigh in on this debate. However, even if scale e¤ects are not
supported empirically, the limiting property of the model should not be viewed as a failure of our
theory. There are several ways to eliminate the scale e¤ect in the limit while still preserving the
mechanism for the economys take-o¤. One is to employ the Yang and Heijdra (1993) construct as
in Peretto (1999). Another is to follow Kortum (1997) and assume that the cost of nding each new
idea becomes increasingly di¢ cult. Using either of these two approaches would not signicantly
change the qualitative properties of the model.
5 Numerical Experiments
In this section, we calibrate the model to the historical record of England over the period 1300-2000,
and use the calibrated structure to examine how the timing of the industrial revolution is a¤ected
by a number of factors emphasized by other researchers as being important for understanding why
England was the rst country to develop.
5.1 Calibration
The calibration strategy is to assign parameter values so that the model equilibrium is characterized
initially by a Malthusian-like era and in the limit by a modern growth era. Empirically, the key
observations of the Malthusian era targeted in the calibration are: (i) a constant living standard,
(ii) a constant rate of population growth, and (iii) a dominant share of agricultural activity in the
14We do not call this a development trap because unless we make assumptions that a in equation (21) goes to
zero in the limit, then there will be increases in agricultural output per person in the industrialization trap.
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economy. Empirically, the key observations of the modern growth era targeted in the calibration
are: (i) a constant, positive rate of growth of per capita GDP, and (ii) a dominant share of indus-
trial activity in the economy. Theoretically, for the model to generate a modern growth era, the
population growth rate must converge to zero in the limit. This is another key restriction in the
calibration exercise.
Table 1: Parameter Values
Parameters Comments/Observations
1. Population
N0 = 5 million average estimate of population in England in 1300
2. Industrial technology parameters
Ax0 = 1 normalization
 = 0:38 median percentage of ratio of non-production to production work-
ers in US manufacturing outside central o¢ ces (Berman et al.,
1994)
 = 4:0 limiting growth of per capita GDP between 1.5-2.0% (Maddison,
2001)
 = 209; 537 rm size of 2 workers in 1300
3. Agricultural technology parameters
Aa0 = 179 constant agricultural living standard in pre-1500 era
a = 0:0095 pre-1500 average annual population growth rate of 0.025% (Mad-
dison, 2001)
 = 0:71 1700 labor share in agriculture estimate (Clark, 2002a, Hayami
and Ruttan, 1971)
4. Preference parameters
ca = 1:55 agricultural share of employment in 1600 (Allen, 2000)
 = 0:98 2% limiting share of agricultures share of employment (Mitchell,
1988)
 = 0:9125 total fertility rate in 2007 for London of 1.80.
 = 0:50 mark-up estimates between 5-15% in the limit (Jaimovich and
Floetotto, 2008)
5. Child rearing parameters
 f = 0:021 zero population growth in the limit
x = 0:095 estimates between 7.5-15% per household (de la Croix and Doepke,
2004)
Before assigning parameters, it is necessary to identify the empirical counterpart of a model
period, and the beginning year. Given that households live for one period during which they raise
their o¤spring, it is reasonable to interpret a period as the time that elapses between generations.
In models that employ a two-period generational construct, a period is typically assigned a length
of 35 years. However, since our model is one of the last millennium and as life expectancies were far
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shorter before the 20th century, we choose 25 years for the period length. The rst model period
is identied with the year 1300. This choice is primarily motivated by data availability.
Table 1 lists the parameter values and provides brief comments on how each was assigned.
A few additional words are warranted in the case of some of the assignments. First, the target for
rm size in 1300 is set to 2 workers. This number is not based on an exact estimate, but on the
idea that a typical workplace in 1300 probably consisted of a master craftsman and an apprentice.
Second, although the initial population is set to the average estimate for England in 1300, it could
easily have been normalized to some other number. The reason is that the calibrated value for the
circumference of the variety circle is set to match an initial rm size of 2 workers. As a result, a
change in the initial population would simply translate into a change in the circumference of the
variety circle, without a¤ecting any of the quantitative results.15 The unimportance of the initial
population size makes it clear that in our theory rm size is the key determinant of innovation.
That is, population size only matters in as far as it a¤ects rm size.
Another assignment that requires some explanation is the labor share parameter in agricul-
ture. The empirical counterpart of the share of agricultural output that goes to labor has increased
steadily over the last four centuries. Labors share in agriculture was 67 percent in 1600 according
to Clark (2002a) and 86 percent in 1950 according to Hayami and Ruttan (1971). As the model
does not allow for this secular rise, the labor share parameter, , is set to the 1700 trend-value
based on a linear interpolation of the 1600 and 1950 estimates.16 Lastly, although the time cost of
rural child rearing is not set to match time use data, the value for  f implied by the zero growth
condition is consistent with estimates of child rearing costs in rural areas, such as by Ho (1979) in
the case of the Philippines.17
Figures 1-6 present the equilibrium path for the model economy from 1300 to 2000 along
six dimensions: technological progress in the industrial sector, the growth rate of GDP per capita,
the growth rate of population, agricultures share of employment, the relative price of industrial
goods, and rm size in terms of number of workers. Where appropriate and available, we plot
the real world counterparts of the data for the English economy. Growth rates in the gures are
15The quantity of land must also be changed in proportion to the population change in order generate the same
equilibrium.
16We have redone the calibration to match the post-1950 estimate, and the equilibrium properties are quantitatively
the same.
17Ho (1979) nds that child rearing takes 15% of a womans time (or 7.5% of parentstime) for an average of 3.6
children present in the household at the time of the survey. This amounts to 2.1% of parentstime per child, identical
to the value of f used in the calibration.
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Figure 1: Technological Progress (Benchmark)
expressed in annual terms. Data on the growth rates of GDP per capita and population are based
on Maddison (2001). Data on the agricultural share of employment come from Allen (2000) for
the 1300-1800 period, and thereafter from Mitchell (1988).18 Data on relative prices are from Yang
and Zhu (2008) for the 1700-1909 period, and are then extended through 1938 using the Sauerbeck
price series in Mitchell (1988).19 Data on rm size pertain to the United States, given the absence
of historical time series for England. They measure establishment size in the manufacturing sector,
and the sources are Atack and Bateman (2006) prior to 1970 and the U.S. Census of Manufactures
for more recent years.
In terms of population growth, output growth, and agricultures share of economic activity,
the calibrated model matches the historical experience of the English economy extremely well. We
emphasize that we did not calibrate the model economy to Englands Industrial Revolution: we
calibrated to the pre-1700 Malthusian era and the post-1950 modern growth era. Thus, the models
ability to match the starting date of Englands Industrial Revolution as well as its growth rate of per
18Clark (2002b) also provide estimates for agricultures share of employment for the 1500-1700 period for England.
They are lower than those of Allen (2000), and can be interpreted as a lower bound. Calibrating to Clarks gures is
not a problem. Another alternative is to use the estimates of Allen (2000) for the rural population, rather than the
agricultural population. Those gures provide an upper bound.
19We were not able to extend the British data on relative prices beyond 1938. For the United States, however,
the relative price of manufactured goods has shown no secular trend in the 20th century. This is consistent with the
models prediction of a constant relative price in the balanced growth path.
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capita GDP, its population growth rate, and its agricultures share of employment for the period
1750-1950 represents four successful tests of our theory.
In terms of the specic mechanism underlying our theory  the relation between market
size, rm size and innovation  the calibrated model also does well. Both in the data and in the
calibration the number of production workers per establishment increases four-fold between 1850
and 2000. It appears from Figure 6 that the model is slightly o¤ in the timing of this increase.
However, it is important to note that the data in Figure 6 pertain to the United States. Given
that the Industrial Revolution in the England started between 50 and 100 years earlier than in the
United States, the models prediction for the timing of the increase in rm size seems about right.
Although the model closely matches the growth rate of Englands population from 1300
to 2000, it does not perform as well in matching English urban and rural fertility rates over this
period. In particular, the model predicts a secular rise in both fertility rates. This counterfactual
prediction should not, however, be viewed as a failure of the theory, as it can be easily amended
by assuming increasing child rearing time costs in both sectors.
On other dimensions that are specic to our theoretical mechanism, comparisons with the
data are harder. For example, the predicted decline in mark-ups of 7 percent in our model is lower
than the 67 percent computed by Ellis (2006) for the period 1870-1985. However, these numbers
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are not directly comparable, since the Ellis gure was not calculated from price and wage data, but
instead was estimated within a specic model economy using a state-space approach. As for the
increase in the number of consumer varieties predicted by the model, there are no specic estimates
in the data to compare our results to. In addition, recall that in our theoretical model the number
of varieties coincides with the number of rms. Therefore, in as far as we match the size of rms
and the number of workers in the industrial sector, we are also matching what corresponds to the
number of varieties in our model.20
Whereas the intuition for the models take-o¤ and limiting properties are clear, the transi-
tional dynamics require some further discussion. The dening feature of the industrial revolution is
the acceleration in the innovation rate. This acceleration is due to a variety of factors. Once the in-
dustrial sector starts to innovate, incomes rise. This makes the subsistence constraint less binding,
shifting demand to industrial goods. Rising incomes also lead to higher population growth, further
increasing the size of the industrial market. Additionally, recall that agricultural TFP growth goes
up in response to industrial innovation, thus encouraging more workers to move from the farm to
the city. Taken together, these di¤erent forces imply a growing industrial sector, and thus a rising
rate of innovation.
With the exception of the population growth rate and the relative price of industrial goods,
the secular trends are monotonic. The non-monotonicity of the population growth rate is the
consequence of the di¤erential cost of rearing children and the rising share of the urban population.
The non-monotonicity of the relative price reects the behavior of the ratio of the industrial wage
rate to technology, wx=[Ax(1 + gv)], which a¤ects the price charged by an industrial rm as shown
in equation (16). This ratio declines throughout much of the transition period from Malthusian
stagnation to modern growth, and then increases slightly before converging to a constant. This
pattern arises because the absolute size of the agricultural population initially increases, then
decreases, and eventually stabilizes as the economy converges to a constant population. Because
land is a xed factor, this implies that agricultural household income initially grows slower, then
faster, and eventually at the same rate as technical progress in industry. Since households must
be indi¤erent between working in both sectors, the evolution of industrial household income is
similar: it rst grows more, than less, and eventually at the same rate as technological progress.
20The coincidence of number of rms and number of varieties is natural if one re-interprets the Lancaster variety
model as a spatial model, in which goods are di¤erentiated by location. That being said, there are of course ways to
introduce a distinction between the number of rms and the number of varieties. For example, we could modify the
model to allow for the introduction of new goods through the introduction of new variety circles.
29
This explains the non-monotonic behavior of this ratio, and the relative price of industrial goods.
In summary, the model is able to predict the main features of Englands Industrial Revolu-
tion, in particular, its demographic transition, its structural transformation, and its rate of growth.
It also closely matches the evolution of rm size. This is important, as the change in the size of
rms over time is specic to the theoretical mechanism we emphasize. In light of the overall success
of the model, it is informative to investigate how factors that are likely to di¤er across societies
a¤ect the timing of the industrial revolution. This is the subject we analyze next.
5.2 The Timing of the Industrial Revolution
In this section we explore how certain parameters a¤ect the timing of the industrial revolution.
Since numerous researchers have emphasized the role of agriculture for long run development,
we consider how the start of the industrial revolution is a¤ected by the economys initial level of
agricultural TFP, Aa0, and its growth rate, a. Additionally we examine how the economys take-o¤
is a¤ected by the xed cost parameters,  and . This we do because operating costs and R&D costs
can be a¤ected by institutions, and because numerous researchers have argued that institutional
developments were critical for Englands economic success. Finally, we examine how the economys
take-o¤ is a¤ected by cutting its initial population and land endowment in half. This experiment
aims to capture the e¤ect of trade restrictions, another factor that has been strongly emphasized
in the literature. While we cannot analyze the e¤ect of trade restrictions in the sense of a small
increase in transportation costs, halving an economys initial population and land endowment is
equivalent to taking two identical open economies and closing them to trade.
Before reporting the ndings, we emphasize that these experiments are not intended to
address the question why the industrial revolution of some country other than England happened
a certain number of years later. International spillovers from early starters to later followers have
clearly been important in understanding the development path of the latter by accelerating their
escape from Malthusian stagnation. A multi-country model with international spillovers is not
something studied in this paper. To be clear, the following experiments are limited to analyzing
how di¤erent initial conditions would have a¤ected the timing of Englands take-o¤.
5.2.1 Agricultural Productivity
How much later would the Industrial Revolution in England have occurred if agricultural productiv-
ity had been lower? Several researchers, such as Schultz (1968) and Diamond (1997), have argued
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Figure 7: E¤ect of Lower Agricultural TFP on Timing of Industrial Revolution
that high agricultural productivity is a necessary condition for long-run development. Towards
the goal of answering this question, we conduct two experiments. The rst of these lowers the
value of initial agricultural TFP, Aa0, by 10 percent, whereas the second reduces the growth rate
of agricultural TFP during the pre-industrial period, a, by 25 percent. The results for process
innovation are displayed in Figure 7.21
Not surprisingly, a lower starting level of agricultural TFP delays the onset of the industrial
revolution. This happens because population size is smaller in the Malthusian era, implying fewer
di¤erentiated goods and smaller industrial rms at any date. The size of the delay, 250 years,
associated with the 10 percent decline in agricultural TFP, may seem surprising, but it is not.
With the calibrated growth rate of agricultural TFP of 0.038 percent per annum in the benchmark
case, it takes slightly more than 250 years for agricultural TFP to rise by 10 percent. In other
words, the 250 year delay found in this experiment reects the time it takes agricultural TFP
to reach the initial benchmark level. The size of the delay, however, does suggest that a modest
increase in agricultural TFP can be extremely important for an economys takeo¤.
For similar reasons, a lower rate of agricultural TFP growth also delays the onset of the
industrial revolution. For an annual growth rate of 0.029 percent (instead of 0.038 percent), the
21 In these experiments, we adjust the initial population so that the economy continues to display a Malthusian era
steady state.
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Figure 8: E¤ect of Worse Institutions on Timing of Industrial Revolution
start is only delayed by about 75 years. This shorter delay makes sense: to achieve the same
accumulated growth as with the benchmark TFP growth of 0.038 percent over 250 years takes
about 75 years more with a TFP growth of 0.029 percent.
5.2.2 Policy and Institutions
We next explore how the timing of Englands Industrial Revolution was a¤ected by institutional
factors, a main theme in the research of North and Thomas (1973), North and Weingast (1989),
and Ekelund and Tollison (1981). In the real world, the xed costs rms incur to operate and to
innovate depend to a large extent on institutions and policy. We therefore interpret larger values
for the xed cost parameters,  and , as worse institutions and policies. Recall that  is the
xed cost of operating the benchmark technology, whereas  determines how much the xed cost
increases when better technologies are adopted.
Figure 8 shows what happens when we increase each xed cost parameter separately by
25 percent. In the case of a higher xed operating cost , the industrial revolution is delayed
by 175 years; in the case of a 25 percent higher xed adoption cost , the industrial revolution is
delayed by 550 years. Whereas raising either parameter delays the start of the industrial revolution,
the intuition for the delays is di¤erent. In the case of , worse policies or institutions imply less
varieties produced in the economy, meaning the elasticity of demand is lower and innovation is
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Figure 9: E¤ect on Trade Restrictions on Timing of Industrial Revolution
unprotable. In the case of an increase in , the number of varieties and rm size are una¤ected.
However, because the cost of process innovation is higher, rms have to be larger to nd innovation
protable.
Clark (2003) has criticized institutional based theories on account that changes in British
institutions do not time very well with the start of the Industrial Revolution. The Glorious Rev-
olution, of course, occurred in 1688, but the Industrial Revolution did not start for another 100
years. This experiment suggests that Clarks (2003) timing-based argument is not justied. More
to the point, our experiment shows that changes in a countrys institutions that a¤ect operating
and innovation costs are important for the timing of an economys take-o¤, even though the date
of the take-o¤ may lag these changes by several centuries.
5.2.3 Trade
Both international and intranational trade have been identied by numerous authors, such as Find-
lay and ORourke (2007) and Szostak (1991), as being important for Englands early development.
In light of this, we end this section by considering the e¤ect of trade restrictions on the timing
of take-o¤. Although we cannot analyze the e¤ect of an incremental change in trade restrictions,
we can easily compare free trade with autarky. Indeed, taking two identical open economies and
closing them to trade is identical to cutting the economys population and land mass in half. Al-
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though marginal changes in transport or trade costs may be empirically more relevant, comparing
free trade to autarky is, nevertheless, informative and provides an upper bound of the e¤ect of
trade on development.
Figure 9 shows the e¤ect of cutting the countrys size and population in half on the process
innovation.22 Not surprising, the start of the industrial revolution is dramatically delayed, approxi-
mately by 450 years. This experiment suggests an important role played by trade in understanding
Englands long run development.
6 Conclusion
This paper has put forth a unied growth theory that is consistent with the well documented
increase in the variety of consumer goods that preceded the Industrial Revolution and the gradual
shift in the workplace to larger and more centralized production units. We have shown that our
theory is plausible by calibrating the model to Englands long-run development, and by providing
empirical support at the rm and the industry level for the mechanism that underlies our theory.
We have also examined in the calibrated model the role of various factors emphasized by other
researchers as being important for the timing of Englands industrialization. A virtue of our theory
is that this disparate set of factors all a¤ect the date at which the economy industrializes by
changing the price elasticity of demand.
Relative to other unied growth theories, this papers novelty lies in the mechanism by
which larger markets bring about an economys take-o¤, rather than in the idea that an expansion
of markets is critical for industrialization. The importance of market size is, of course, an old idea,
prevalent in the writings of Adam Smith (1776), and a cornerstone of a number of recent unied
growth theories such as Goodfriend and McDermott (1995) and Voigtländer and Voth (2006).
However, in contrast to our mechanism, these alternative theories typically assume some type of
production externality. Our theory does not rely on any type of spillover.
Despite its long history, the view that market size was critical for determining the timing
of the Industrial Revolution is not without controversy. Crafts (1995), for example, has criticized
population-based theories on account that larger countries have not grown faster in the postwar
period. This misses the point in the sense that population size is not an adequate measure of
market size. In our theory the e¤ective size of the industrial market, and not population size per
22 In this case we do let the change in initial population a¤ect the initial rm size. If not, the initial population size
would not matter, as explained before.
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se, is the key determinant of an economys take-o¤. Whereas the e¤ective size of the industrial
market depends on a countrys total population, it is also a¤ected by transport costs, internal and
external trade barriers, agricultural productivity, income levels, and institutions.
Compared to other European countries, the evidence suggests that on the eve of the In-
dustrial Revolution markets in England were more national in scale. For example, using spatial
variations in grain prices, Shiue and Keller (2007) show that England was more integrated than the
rest of Europe. One reason for this were the vast improvements in road and canal infrastructure
during the 17th and 18th centuries. By the 1750s, the average coach in England traveled about
100 kilometers per day, doubling the speed in France (Szostak, 1991).
But did the expanding market size in England also imply that the market for industrial
goods was larger than in other countries? Although more research is needed to answer this question,
the evidence suggests it was. We know that agricultural productivity in England was twice as large
as in France (Allen, 2000), and that England had a higher income per capita. It was also far more
urbanized with 23 percent of the population in England living in cities, compared with only 13
percent in France (Allen, 2000). The only advantage of France was its larger population. However,
even if we make the extreme assumption that French industrial markets were national in scale, the
seller side of the industrial market in France (roughly speaking, the urban population) was not
any greater than in England, approximately 2 million people. Comparisons with other continental
European countries are equally favorable to England.
As for China, economic historians consider the relevant comparison to be with the Yangtze
Delta, Chinas most vibrant region in the 18th century. Although the Yangtze Delta had a much
larger population than England, its income per capita and its agricultural productivity were not only
lower than Englands, but they had been trending downwards since the 17th century, prompting
Allen (2006) to conclude that the Yangtze Delta could best be described as an economy becoming
increasingly involuted rather than on the brink of take-o¤. Consistent with this view, Shiue and
Keller (2007) report that the Yangtze Delta looked more like continental European countries, and
was thus lagging England in terms of market integration.
Clearly, this evidence is suggestive, and more careful research is needed in this area. Cal-
culating price variations across regions for manufactured goods would be one step in the right
direction. Determining production volumes of manufactured goods and the markets in which they
were traded would be another step. We know that the colonies were an important market for Eng-
lish manufactures and hence such an analysis would have to take these international trade ows
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into account. Given the success of our theory, these future areas of research are warranted.
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